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How Much Green for the Buck? Estimating
Additional and Windfall Effects of the French
Agro-Environmental Schemes by DID-Matching
Abstract
Agro-environmental schemes (AES), consisting in paying farmers for adopting prac-
tices more favorable to the environment, are increasingly important components of
environmental and agricultural policies both in the US and the EU. In this paper,
we study the French implementation of the EU AES program. We estimate addi-
tional and windfall effects of five AESs, for a representative sample of individuals
farmers using Difference-In-Difference (DID) matching. We test for cross-effects,
examine the implications of the identifying assumptions by implementing a placebo
test, provide a lower bound using DDD-matching, and insert our estimates of both
additionality and windfall effects into a cost-benefit framework. We find that the
AESs promoting crop diversity have succeeded in inserting one new crop to the
rotation, but on a very small part of the cropped area. We also find that the
AES subsidizing the planting of cover crops has led to the planting of 10 additional
hectares of cover crops on the average recipient farm, at the expense of almost 7
hectares of windfall effect, and that this AES does not appear to be socially effi-
cient. On the contrary, we find that the AES subsidizing grass buffer strips could
very well be socially efficient, despite very large windfall effects. We finally esti-
mate that the AES subsidizing conversion to organic farming has very low windfall
effects and very high additionality.
Keywords: Agro-environmental Schemes - Additionality - Windfall Effects - Treatment
Effects - Difference in Difference Matching - Agricultural Practices - Crop Diversity -
Cover Crops - Grass Buffer Strips - Organic Farming.
1 Introduction
Payments for environmental services are widely used to improve environmental outcomes.
Agro-environmental schemes (AES), consisting in paying farmers for adopting practices
more favorable to the environment, are increasingly important components of environ-
mental and agricultural policies both in the US and the EU. In this paper, we study
the French implementation of the EU AES program. The AESs that we study aim at
altering agricultural practices in order to improve the environment. Two AESs aim at
increasing crop diversity, which in turn may increase the diversity of habitats, and thus
biodiversity. Increased crop diversity may also reduce weeds’ resistance to pesticides by
diversifying rotations on the same field. Another AES that we study subsidizes the plant-
ing of cover crops during the winter, which curbs erosion and prevents nitrogen leaching
into groundwater by storing it during the winter. We also study an AES that subsidizes
the planting of grass buffer strips, mainly along rivers and streams. Grass buffer strips
are known to be very efficient at preventing nitrogen, phosphorus and pesticide runoff
from fields. They thus contribute to the improvement of surface water quality. Finally,
we study an AES that subsidizes conversion to organic farming. Organic farming bans
the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, thereby reducing the emission of pollutants
into ground and surface water.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the additional and windfall effects of these AESs
on agricultural practices in order to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of each one of them.1
Cost-benefit analysis of these programs indeed critically hinges on the relative extent of
their additional and windfall effects. An AES has an additional effect if it encourages
farmers to adopt environmentally greener practices, i.e. if it has a positive causal effect
on practices that favor the environment. An AES suffers from windfall effects if it pays
for practices that would have been adopted in its absence. Higher additionality improves
the efficiency of the program and thus increases the benefit/cost ratio. Higher windfall
effects, on the contrary, tend to decrease the efficiency of the program by using resources
1We thank the editor and three anonymous referees for suggesting that we insert our estimates into
a cost-benefit framework.
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to pay for practices that would have been adopted anyway, and thus deteriorates the
benefit/cost ratio. The very nature of the AESs that we study opens up the possibility
for large windfall effects. Indeed, these AESs are voluntary programs in which farmers
receive a payment per hectare concerned by the practice. As both the AES requirements
and the per hectare payments are constant for all farmers, the potential for adverse
selection is very high: farmers with the lowest costs of complying with the requirements
of a given AES are the most likely to enter it. Thus, it is very likely that farmers who
self-selected into an AES would in any case have adopted a higher level of the practice
than farmers not entering the AES, had the AES not been implemented.
We estimate additional and windfall effects of the five AESs described above for a
representative sample of French farmers. We use a detailed sample of individual farmers
for whom we have data on practices related to the AESs under study (crops planted, area
under cover crops, grass buffer strip and organic farming) recorded in 2005, five years after
the beginning of the program. We also have data on practices and farms’ and farmers’
characteristics before the program started. Finally, we have detailed and disaggregated
information from administrative sources on the AESs that each farmer has entered. We
show that, under some assumptions, the relevant causal effect measuring additionality
is the so-called average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). ATT is the difference
between the average level of a practice in the presence of an AES and the average level
of the same practice had the AES not been implemented, among farmers benefiting from
an AES. Windfall effects can easily be estimated from average practices observed among
recipients of an AES and the ATT. Estimating the ATT is more complicated since we
cannot observe the average level of a given practice for recipient farmers had the AES not
existed. This is an instance of the fundamental problem of causal inference [25], due to
the impossibility of observing the counterfactual situation. If we try to approximate this
counterfactual quantity among recipient farmers by using the average level of the practice
among non-recipient farmers, our estimates of the ATT will most likely be plagued by
selection bias. Indeed, profit-maximizing farmers self-selecting into an AES have lower
costs of complying with the AES requirements. It is therefore likely that farmers who
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chose to enter an AES would in any case have adopted greener practices than farmers not
entering it, had the AES not been implemented. So a rough comparison of the practices
of recipient farmers to those of non-recipient farmers is likely to overstate the true level
of additionality of an AES.
We use Difference-In-Difference (DID) matching [2, 22] to get rid of selection bias and
to estimate the ATT. DID-matching combines a non-parametric matching procedure with
first-differencing with respect to a pre-treatment period. Matching gets rid of selection
bias due to observed covariates by comparing recipient farmers to similar non-recipient.
First differencing gets rid of selection bias due to time-invariant unobservables. The
validity of DID-matching relies on three assumptions. First, the absence of diffusion
effects of the AESs on non-recipient farmers. Second, the existence of non-recipient
farmers similar to recipient farmers in terms of observed covariates. Third, in the absence
of any AES, the difference in practices between recipient and similar non-recipient farmers
is constant over time. We argue that the economics of the program under study make
it very likely that these assumptions hold in our application. Moreover, we test the
validity of various implications of these assumptions and find evidence in their favor.
We test for the presence of diffusion effects2 by inserting the initial average level of a
given practice among neighboring farmers as a control variable. We find no difference in
estimated treatment effects with or without this additional control variable suggesting
that diffusion effects are absent. We test for the existence of similar farmers by using
Smith and Todd [45]’s common support estimation procedure. We generally find that
non-recipient farmers do exist for most of our treated farmers. Finally, we test for the
constancy of the average difference in practices between recipients and non-recipients in
the absence of the program by implementing a placebo test. We estimate the effect of a
placebo treatment by comparing future recipients to future non-recipients at two different
dates. We find effects of smaller magnitude than the treatment effects, and evidence that
these effects are anticipation effects: because the date at which the requirements are really
binding is uncertain, farmers start complying with the requirements early on. Indeed,
2We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we try to test this assumption.
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these anticipation effects vanish when we look at recipients who will enter an AES at a
later stage. We nevertheless provide a lower bound on the treatment effect by providing
estimates from triple-difference (DDD) matching. Finally, because farmers can enter
multiple AESs and we want to perform a separate cost-benefit analysis for each AES
under study, we show that we can conduct a separate cost-benefit analysis for each AES
if there are no cross-effects among the AESs:3 an AES aimed at altering a given practice
(say cover crops) must not alter any other practice (e.g. conversion to organic farming).
We develop tests of this assumption and find strong support for the absence of cross
effects for most AESs under study.
We find that the AESs subsidizing the planting of cover crops have led to the planting
of 10 additional hectares of cover crops on the average recipient farm, at the expense of
almost 7 hectares of windfall effect. Because the per hectare payment of this AES is quite
high, and because the social value of cover crops is limited, this AES does not appear
to be socially efficient. On the contrary, we find that the AES subsidizing grass buffer
strips could very well be socially efficient, despite very large windfall effects, because grass
buffer strips are very efficient at curbing the runoff of pollutants. We finally estimate
that the AES subsidizing conversion to organic farming has very low windfall effects and
very high additionality. According to our estimates, this AES is responsible for 90 % of
the increase in areas converted to organic farming between 2000 and 2005. We estimate
that it costs 151e to convert one additional hectare to organic farming, compared to an
average estimated social benefit from organic farming of 540e/ha. We cannot apply a
complete cost-benefit analysis to the AESs aiming at increasing crop diversity because
payments were not directly tied to a practice that we can observe. We nevertheless
estimate that these measures triggered the planting of .65 to .85 new species on treated
farms, but on a very limited share of the total farmland, resulting in a small decrease
in the share of the area of farmland covered by the main crop (-3 %), as well as in a
slight increase in the crop diversity index. The modest aims of the AES, only requiring
farmers to add one crop to the rotation, might explain the very limited effects measured.
3We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Overall, we find strong evidence of adverse selection, which induces large windfall effects.
We find that the AESs combining strong requirements in order to curb adverse selection
with large payments, such as the one subsidizing conversion to organic farming, are the
most efficient schemes.
Our paper is not the first attempt at measuring the effects of AESs. The AESs in the
EU are similar to the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the US, in the sense that
the government offers individual farmers or firms temporary subsidies in exchange for
voluntary changes in agricultural practices that are expected to generate environmental
benefits - to reduce crop acreage in this case. Early works include Lynch and Liu [34]
and Lynch, Gray, and Geoghegan [33], who focus on the impact of these AESs on land
prices. Wu [50] and Roberts and Bucholtz [36] run OLS and 2SLS regressions to test the
hypothesis that acreage reductions due to CRP have been offset by increases in cropland
in other areas. Smith and Goodwin [46] estimate a five-equation structural model of
CRP participation, soil erosion, crop insurance participation, conservation, and fertilizer
usage, using a 2SLS procedure, to determine the impact of CRP on soil erosion. Wu,
Adams, Kling, and Tanaka [51] jointly estimate crop choice and the decision to use
conservation tillage and simulate the effects of CRP on erosion and nitrogen leaching and
runoff. Roberts and Lubowski [37] model the decision to establish crops using a binomial
probit regression to predict the likelihood that each CRP contract will return to crop
production if the program were to expire once and for all. Most if not all econometric
studies of CRP are based on a county level database from the United States Department
of Agriculture’s National Resources Inventory, although econometric models are based
on individual farmers’ decisions to enroll land in CRP and change land use. In addition
to the empirical literature on AES evaluation, a growing number of empirical works aim
at estimating the effects of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) voluntary
programs or voluntary international standards like ISO14001 on firms’ environmental
performances. They run a linear 2SLS regression on micro-data to recover the impact
of voluntary programs on the toxic releases and economic performance of firms in the
US [10, 28] and in developing countries [16]. Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama [11] use
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the Bayesian approach (maximum simulated likelihood along with the GHK simulator) to
estimate the impact of the implementation of ISO14001 and publication of environmental
reports on environmental performance of Japanese facilities.
Perhaps the closest paper to our own is the study by Pufahl and Weiss [35] of the
effect of benefiting from at least one AES on farm sales, fertilizer expenditures and cattle
livestock density measured from bookkeeping records of a non-representative sample of
German farms. We focus on different outcomes and implement a separate analysis for each
AES. We test for cross-effects, examine the implications of the identifying assumptions,
provide a lower bound using DDD-matching, and insert our estimates of additionality
and windfall effects into a cost-benefit framework.
This paper is organized as follows: the implementation of AESs in France is presented
in Section 2; the theoretical model and identification strategy are discussed in Section
3; the data used in the paper are presented in Section 4; results of estimations by DID-
matching and robustness checks are presented in Section 5; the cost-benefit analysis is
presented in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
2 Agro-Environmental Schemes in France
Rural development policies accounted for 22 % of public spending for the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union in 2006, and AESs accounted for 37 %
of rural development spending [35]. In France, these figures are lower (resp. 17 % and
25 %), because of a lower use of these schemes in public policy and historically high
levels of direct support.4 AES expenditures in France per hectare of usable agricultural
area (UAA) are lower than in most European countries,5 but it is mainly because the
area covered by AESs is smaller than in other countries, and not because payments per
hectare are small. French AESs are nevertheless worth assessing for three reasons: first,
their share of total public expenditure on agriculture has steadily increased since 1992,
when they were first introduced (for example, public spending for AESs nearly doubled
4According to the French Ministry of Agriculture’s website.
5According to the European Environment Agency’s website.
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between 1999 and 2006). Second, France being the main beneficiary of agricultural poli-
cies in the EU, even a small proportion of the total budget represents a large amount of
money. In 2006, 521 million Euros were spent on AESs in France, accounting for roughly
1 % of total CAP expenditures for the EU as a whole [8]. Finally, the future reform of
the CAP is going to involve a major “greening” of all subsidies. As a result, a growing
share of CAP spending is going to take the form of AESs.
In France, AESs were implemented between 2000 and 2006 as part of the National
Plan for Rural Development (Plan de Développement Rural National (PDRN)). This plan
contained a very thorough description of the different AESs that farmers could apply for,
with some adjustments at regional level (mainly on payments, but regional variation
of payments remained low [13]). AESs were referred to with a seven digit code: the
first two digits referred to the general category of the AES, the following two referred
to the particular requirements the farmer had to meet to enter the AES, the fifth digit
coded for even more detailed requirements, and, finally, the last two digits referred to the
regional variation in the AES. These AESs aim at improving the environment by altering
farmers’ practices. AES 02 encourages crop diversification, which is likely to increase
biodiversity, directly by increasing cropped biodiversity, but also indirectly by enhancing
non-cropped biodiversity. AESs 03 (resp. 04) subsidizes the planting of cover crops (resp.
grass buffer strips) and thus contributes to the reduction of nitrogen, phosphorus and
pesticides leakage (resp. runoff) from the field. This in turn decreases the concentrations
of pollutants in surface and ground waters. AESs 08 and 09 aim at decreasing the levels
of pesticides and nitrogen applications on the fields, which also might decrease leakage
and runoff. AES 21 encourages diversification toward organic farming, a practice that
has been shown to be friendlier to the environment than conventional farming.
Taken together, these AESs accounted for 22 % of total spending on AES in 2006
in France.6 We usually stick to the 2-digit level, with the exception of measures 0201,
0205 and 0301. Measures 0201 and 0205 both aim to increase the diversity of crop
6Subsidies for extensive farming of meadows accounted for 60 % of total spending for the AES in
France in 2006. As described in Chabé-Ferret and Subervie [15], the methods applied in this paper
cannot be used to estimate the impact of these subsidies because most of the eligible population benefits
from them, so that they tend to affect non-participants as well, mainly through the land market.
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rotation, but the former requires the addition of one crop to the rotation whereas the
latter simply requires that at least four different crops be grown on the farm. Among
the 03 measures, we focus on those requiring the sowing of cover crops during winter
(0301), since they are the most widely chosen. Measures 0302 and 0303 (respectively
replacing spring crops by winter crops and mowing residues) have a very low take-up
rate. There is more variation within measures 08 and 09 with respect to the requirements:
measures 0801 and 0903, which have the highest take-up rate within their respective 2-
digit categories, have low requirements (mainly recording practices and choosing the
frequency of pesticide interventions and the quantity of fertilizer spread with respect to
analysis or yield expectation), while measures with more drastic requirements like the
0901 (reduction of 20 % of nitrogen use with respect to a local baseline) have lower
take-up rates.
AESs are five-year contracts, with yearly payments and possible control of how well
the requirements are met. Farmers can enroll only part of their farm under an AES,
and combine different AESs on the same part of their farm or on different ones. Farmers
receive the same payments per hectare for a given AES. These payments have been
calculated so as to compensate an average farmer for the profit loss following the adoption
of the practice. Total payments are proportional to the area on which the farmer declares
to implement the requirements. The main way for farmers to benefit from an AES during
this period was to submit a written application containing an environmental diagnosis
of their farm and the particular measures they were applying for. An administrative
authority then had to approve or refuse the application. Almost all applications were
approved. A contract was then signed, stipulating the farmer’s commitments and a
schedule of annual payments. The time between a farmer’s application and the signing
of the contract was of at least a year. In order to submit a valid application, most
of the farmers benefited from the assistance of union-run local public administrations
called Chambres départementales d’Agriculture (CA). The amount of assistance given
to individual farmers by each CA varied widely across France, because right-wing CAs
opposed the implementation of these contracts, as they came under a policy introduced
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by a left-wing government. In 2003, all applications were temporarily frozen by the
newly elected government because of an unexpected surge in the number of applications.
Contracts were gradually reinstated with an informal restriction on the total payments
that an individual farmer could receive. This delay had not been anticipated by farmers
who had applied to the AES program; as a result they altered their practices before being
recorded as beneficiaries in the administrative files.
3 Theoretical model and identification strategy
In this section, we develop a model of an agricultural household deciding whether or not
taking part in a unique AES program and then choosing its level of input. Identifica-
tion assumptions are then presented as restrictions on this model. We finally deal with
the complexities of the real world scenario in which farmers can simultaneously choose
multiple AESs.
3.1 Modeling farmers’ participation in an AES
We model a household making two sequential decisions. First, it decides whether or not to
enter an AES, knowing the level of payments P it would receive, the type of constraints it
would face, and information at hand on profit and utility determinants noted I. Second,
all uncertain outcomes are revealed and the household chooses the level of inputs that
maximizes its utility, while having to cope with the AES constraints in the event that it
has chosen to enter the scheme. We solve this problem with backward induction, so that
we first focus on production decisions and how the AES impact them, and then consider
the household’s decision to enter the scheme.7
7We do not explicitly model the dynamic behavior or farmers. Dynamics could play an important role
if there are large learning effects of entering a scheme and if the sunk costs for changing practices are large.
We do not think that there are large sunk costs for most of the practices we study, with the exception of
organic farming. Farmers wishing to convert to organic farming may have delayed their decision in order
to benefit from AES 21. For our estimates to be correct, we have to assume that the costs of entering
the schemes were not anticipated by the farmers, so that some of the delayers actually could not enter
the scheme at a reasonable cost. This is an application of the general result of Abbring and Heckman
[7] that a structural dynamic model with the assumptions in Rust [41] implies conditional exogeneity
assumptions that resemble matching in a dynamic framework. To our knowledge, there is no such result
relating structural dynamic models allowing for unobserved fixed effects à la Keane and Wolpin [27] to
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Input choices with and without the AES
The household produces only one agricultural good, whose price is pQ, in quantity Q,
by combining a variable input Y whose price is pY with household labor (H) and other
factors of production. These consist of the fixed factors that the household possesses,
like physical and human capital and land, stored into the vector I and unobserved factors
like managerial ability, land quality and weather shocks, gathered into the vector . The
production function F is such that: Q = F (Y,H, I, ). Among the unobserved factors
, we distinguish between factors fixed through time (like managerial ability and land
quality, noted µ) and those that vary through time (like weather shocks, noted e). We
thus have  = (µ, e).When a household has entered an AES (D = 1) it receives payments
P as a compensation for making a restricted use of inputs Y , so that Y ≤ Y¯ .8 The
household derives income from farming but also from working Hoff hours off the farm for
a wage w. It derives utility from consumption C and leisure L. Since Fall and Magnac
[19] have empirically shown that French farmers strongly exhibit a particular preference
for on-farm work, we add this feature à la Lopez [32] to our model, along with the
possibility that farmers have a particular distaste for some inputs, due for example to
ecological preferences.9 Heterogeneity of tastes is described by two vectors: S, containing
observed consumption shifters (family size, age of children, etc.) and η, which accounts for
unobserved taste shifters. Here again we make a distinction between unobserved shifters
that are fixed through time (like ecological preferences, taste for work on the farm, noted
δ) and time-varying idiosyncratic taste shifters (like non-farm profit opportunities, noted
the assumptions behind DID-matching. This goes beyond the scope of our paper. With DID-matching,
we assume the additive separability of the fixed effects, whereas a structural dynamic model would make
stronger functional form assumptions and would restrict the distribution of the unobservable to have a
(low) finite number of points of support. Such a model would help measuring expectation effects, but we
do not expect them to be very large. We view DID-matching as imposing the minimum set of reasonable
assumptions that allows us to estimate the effect of the program we study.
8This setting is closer to AESs 08 and 09 that encourage farmers to use less inputs. The discussion
of our identification strategy derived from this special case extends to the other AESs we study.
9Note that if the household has no particular taste for working on the farm or for using inputs, the
production decision is fully separable from the consumption decision [47], a special case nested in our
model.
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n). We thus have η = (δ,n).10 The problem the household faces is:
max
C,L,H,Hoff,Y
U(C,L,H, Y,S,η) (1)
subject to:
C = pQQ− pY Y + wHoff +DP (2)
Q = F (Y,H, I, ) (3)
D(Y − Y¯ ) ≤ 0 (4)
L+H +Hoff = T (5)
where T is the total time available to the household.
The first order condition for the input level is the following (with λY the Lagrange
multiplier associated to the input constraint):11
∂U
∂C
(
pQ
∂F
∂Y
− pY
)
+ ∂U
∂Y
− λYD = 0. (6)
From Equation (6) we can define the so-called individual causal effect, which is the
basis of our evaluation problem. Without the AES (i.e. when D = 0 in equation (6)), the
household chooses the input level Y 0 that equalizes the marginal increase in utility, due
to a marginal increase in agricultural profits, with the marginal disutility of using inputs.
This level depends on all the exogenous variables of the problem, including the household
characteristics S and η, as production decisions are not separable from consumption:12
Y 0 = g0(pQ, pY , w, T, I,S, ,η). (7)
In an AES (i.e. when D = 1 in equation (6)), either the input constraint is binding,
so that Y 1 = Y¯ , or the input constraint is not binding (λY = 0), and Y 1 ≤ Y¯ . Generally,
10Factors stored in n can also reflect idiosyncratic variations in the wage or in the unemployment
probability.
11A similar condition holds for labor on the farm and leisure.
12This equation is a solution to the set of first-order conditions of the household’s problem, including
those related to labor that are not shown here. We assume properties of the problem so that such a
solution exists.
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we have:
Y 1 = g1(P, Y¯ , pQ, pY , w, T, I,S, ,η). (8)
Y 1 and Y 0 are usually called potential outcomes. The individual-level causal effect
of the AES (∆Y ) is the difference between the input level chosen by the household if it
enters the AES and the input level it chooses if it does not enter the AES: ∆Y = Y 1−Y 0.
The observed input choice Y depends on whether or not the farmer has entered the
AES: Y = Y 1D + Y 0(1 − D). The individual-level causal effect of the AES is thus not
observable, since only one of the two potential input choices is observed. This is an
instance of the fundamental problem of causal inference [25]. Because of this problem
of missing data, researchers usually try to recover some averages of treatment effects
on various subpopulations, such as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT ),
which is the average effect of the AES on those who have chosen to enter it: ATT =
E [Y 1 − Y 0|D = 1]. The value of this parameter is the one we try to recover here.
The causal effect might vary across the population, depending on whether the input
constraint is binding or not. Indeed, constrained households (for which λY > 0) have to
decrease their level of inputs in order to cope with the AES constraints. Thus for these
households, we will have ∆Y < 0. Unconstrained households (for which λY = 0) could
enter the AES at no cost, i.e. without modifying their agricultural practices, so that the
the program has no effect on them (∆Y = 0).13 These households would thus benefit
from a pure windfall effect: they receive a subsidy but do not change their practices at
all.
The sign and magnitude of the ATT will depend on the relative proportions of con-
strained and unconstrained households in the pool of participants. Note that, as con-
strained households bear a larger cost of entry than unconstrained households, the latter
are likely to be more represented in the pool of participants than in the whole population.
It is thus unsure whether the ATT is strictly positive. In the extreme case of a program
attracting only unconstrained households, the ATT may very well be null.
13Unconstrained households may also have a particular taste for working on the farm or for using
inputs so that they may change their practices when they have opted for an AES, because of an income
effect due to the monetary transfer. For these particular households, the sign of ∆Y is unknown a priori.
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Farmers’ decision to enter the AES
We note V 1 and V 0 the utility of the household when it is respectively in or out of the
AES program. V1 and V0 are the indirect utility functions defined by equations (1), (2),
(3), (4) and (5). They depend on the same variables as Y 1 and Y 0. We note V the
disutility of applying to the AES program. It depends on the time spent preparing the
application, which may vary depending on the level of education, participation in past
programs and possible assistance provided by agricultural unions. The household decides
to enter the AES only if the expected utility gain is higher than the application costs:
D = 1 [E [V1 − V0|I]− V ≥ 0] , (9)
where I denotes the information set of the agents when deciding whether to participate in
the AES or not. Selection bias arises because some determinants of farmers’ participation
stored in I are also determinants of input demands. Typically, fixed factors of production
(I), land quality and managerial ability (µ), consumption shifters (S) and ecological
preferences (δ) are known to the farmers when they decide to enter the AES. Farmers who
choose to participate in an AES are thus also more likely to have lower input demands.
A simple comparison of the practices of participants and non-participants would thus
overstate the effects of the program, since in the absence of the program participants
would have used less input on average than non-participants:
E [Y |D = 1]− E [Y |D = 0] = ATT
+ E
[
Y 0|E [V1 − V0|I] ≥ V
]
− E
[
Y 0|E [V1 − V0|I] < V
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection bias
. (10)
3.2 Identification strategy
In this section, we derive the assumptions needed to identify ATT using DID-matching
as restrictions on the economic model presented in the previous section. We discuss the
validity of these conditions and offer ways to test their implications. Matching estimators
assume that after conditioning on a set of observable characteristics (Z), outcomes are
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conditionally mean independent of program participation. The conditional mean indepen-
dence assumption on Y 0 can be written: E [Y 0|D = 1, Z] = E [Y 0|D = 0, Z]. However, for
a variety of reasons there may be systematic differences between participant and nonpar-
ticipant outcomes, even after conditioning on observables. This could lead to a violation of
the identification conditions required for matching. A DID-matching strategy, as defined
in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd [22], allows for temporally invariant unobserved differ-
ences in outcomes between participants and nonparticipants that closely resemble fixed
effects in a panel data setting. Differencing the outcomes gets rid of the selection bias due
to these unobservables. The conditional mean independence assumption on increments of
Y 0 that underlies DID-matching is: E [Y 0t − Y 0t′ |D = 1, Z] = E [Y 0t − Y 0t′ |D = 0, Z], with
t (resp. t′) a post- (resp. pre-) treatment date. Under this assumption, DID-matching
estimates are obtained by applying matching to the outcomes differenced with respect to
a pre-treatment period. Two additional assumptions are needed to ensure that match-
ing and DID-matching both recover an average causal effect on the treated. First, for
each treated observation, there has to exist some untreated units having the same level
of the observed covariates, i.e. we require that there exist common support for the ob-
served covariates. Second, we need that untreated units’ outcomes are not altered by the
presence of the treatment among treated units, an assumption usually called SUTVA.
We first deal with the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), then with
the assumption of conditional independence of increments and, finally, with the common
support assumption.
The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)
Rubin [40]’s SUTVA restricts the impact of the program on non-participants to null. It
requires that, irrespective of how the treatment (here, the input constraint and associ-
ated payment) is allocated among farmers, each farmer’s input level does not depend on
whether the other farmers are being treated. In order to recover the ATT, we require the
following restriction to hold in our model:
Assumption 1. The level of prices (pQ, pY , w), the distribution of observed and un-
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observed determinants of input use (T, I,S, ,η) and the function g0 remain the same
whether the AES is implemented or not.
This assumption requires that observed and unobserved fixed production factors are
the same whether the AES is implemented or not, thus ruling out anticipation effects. It
also requires the AES not to have any effects on input and output prices. Assumption 1 is
far more likely to hold for AESs with an associated low take-up rate, and if prices of inputs
and outputs are determined on a large market. The AESs that we study in this paper
fall into this category. As a matter of fact, AESs requiring reduced input use are mainly
chosen by cereal growers, with a low take-up rate in this population. Moreover, the price
of pesticides, fertilizers and cereals are mainly determined on the world market.14
This assumption also rules out imitation effects or increasing returns (due for example
to several farmers creating a co-op to sell their organic products, while an isolated farmer
cannot and may find it difficult to sell her products).15 In that case, note that the
estimated treatment effects will be biased downward, as farmers not entering the scheme
may adopt a given practice because their neighbors have entered the scheme, and thus our
estimates of treatment effects can be interpreted as lower bounds on the true treatment
effect. Note however that conversion to organic farming following entry into an AES may
decrease the prices of organic products. In that case, we expect entry in the AES by
some farmers to deter other farmers from organic farming and DID-matching estimates
would be biased upward.
Assumption 1 assumes away price and imitation effects and increasing returns due to
neighboring farmers entering an AES. We set up a test of the validity of SUTVA based
on the proportion of farmers adopting a given practice before anyone enters a scheme.
Farmers having converted to organic farming before 2000 also generate imitation effects
and/or increasing returns that make their neighbors more likely to go organic, and also to
enter the scheme paying for this conversion. That means that if there are imitation effects,
14By contrast, measures favoring extensive management of meadows are chosen by almost the entire
eligible population, and the price of land is largely determined at a local level. Being able to consider the
impact of different measures separately enables us to focus only on the measures for which assumption
1 is most likely to hold.
15We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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our estimates suffer from omitted variables bias: the initial proportion of a farmer’s
neighbors that has adopted the practice of interest (organic farming, cover crops) may
at the same time determine selection into the corresponding scheme and outcomes in the
absence of the treatment. The same is true for price effects: the larger the initial number
of competitors, the less profitable the conversion to organic farming and thus entry into
the corresponding scheme. At the end of the day, if there are imitation effects, price
effects or increasing returns, controlling for the amount of neighbors initially adopting
the practice would change our estimated treatment effects with respect to a baseline
estimate not controlling for this variable. If the estimate increases (resp. decreases), then
imitation (resp. price) effects dominate.
Assumption 1 implies that the effect of implementing the voluntary AES on those
who have not entered it is null. Under this assumption, ATT is thus the policy-relevant
parameter that enables us to compare the agricultural practices observed after the pro-
gram has been implemented to a counterfactual situation where the AES program would
not have existed and would not have been replaced by any other program of the same
type [24], thereby estimating the level of additionality of the AES program.
The assumption of conditional independence of increments
The crucial identification assumption in DID-matching is the conditional independence
of increments [2, 22, 35]. It states that, in the absence of the program, the average
increment in input use among participants is equal to the average increment in input use
among observationally equivalent non-participants. In our economic model, the validity
of the assumption of conditional independence of increments requires the three following
restrictions to hold simultaneously:
Assumption 2. The three following conditions must hold simultaneously:
(i) I =
{
P, Y¯ , pQ, pY , w, T, I,S,µ, δ
}
,
(ii) (V,µ, δ)  (e,n) | (T, I,S) and (e,n) | (T, I,S) i.i.d,
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(iii) Y 0 = l0(T, I,S,µ, δ, e,n) + m0(pQ, pY , w, T, I,S, e,n), for some functions l0 and
m0.
Part (i) of assumption 2 states that a farmer’s decision to enter an AES does not
depend on time-varying unobserved factors e (weather shocks) and n (idiosyncratic wage
shocks). This ensures that selection in the program is based either on observed variables
or on unobserved variables fixed through time. This assumption seems realistic because
participation in AESs is decided two to five years before practices are observed. This lag
between entry into the program and the decision about input use means that farmers
may not be able to forecast the level of the transitory determinants of input use e and n
when deciding to enter the program.
Part (ii) of assumption 2 implies that all the dependence between V and Y 0 is due
either to observed covariates or to unobserved time-constant shifters (µ and δ). It also
means that transitory productivity shocks cannot be correlated to long-term determinants
of productivity or tastes. Such assumptions can reasonably hold, as knowing the long-
term mean climate does not help to forecast the climatic anomalies around this long run
level for a given year. Finally, part (ii) also requires time-varying idiosyncratic shocks not
to be autocorrelated. The main autocorrelated profit shocks may transit through prices,
wages or activities. As we control for non-agricultural activities or specific contracts for
quality products, it seems reasonable that we control for all autocorrelated idiosyncratic
profit shocks.
Parts (i) and (ii) imply that the household can act upon information unobserved by
us (µ and δ). Participants and non-participants with the same value for the observed
variables (T , I,S) may thus differ in unobserved dimensions, which results in selection
bias even when conditioning on observed covariates, i.e. selection on unobservables [23].
Part (iii) of assumption 2 is a way to deal with this bias. It requires that the effect
of the unobserved time-constant shifters on input demand be additively separable from
the effect of time-varying covariates (e.g. prices). Observationally identical households
must thus respond identically to variations in prices, even if they differ in unobserved
dimensions. As a consequence, the average difference in practices between participants
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and observationally identical non-participants must be constant through time. Non-
participants may nevertheless adopt practices more favorable to the environment because
of changes in prices or in other policies.16 Under assumption 2, we have:
E[Y 0it |Di = 1, Ti, Ii,Si]− E
[
Y 0it |Di = 0, Ti, Ii,Si
]
= E [l0(Ti, Ii,Si,µi, δi, eit,nit)|Di = 1, Ti, Ii,Si]
− E [l0(Ti, Ii,Si,µi, δi, eit,nit)|Di = 0, Ti, Ii,Si] (11)
= E
[
Y 0it′|Di = 1, Ti, Ii,Si
]
− E
[
Y 0it′|Di = 0, Ti, Ii,Si
]
, (12)
where t′ refers to a pre-treatment period. The first equality is a consequence of parts (i)
and (ii) of assumption 2 ((eit,nit) do not depend on the decision to participate). The
second equality stems from the fact that (eit,nit) are i.i.d., so that their distribution
at period t can be replaced by their distribution at period t′. Note that by rearranging
equation (12), we get the standard assumption of conditional independence of increments,
which is commonly used when applying DID-matching estimators:
E
[
Y 0it − Y 0it′ |Di = 1, Ti, Ii,Si
]
= E
[
Y 0it − Y 0it′ |Di = 0, Ti, Ii,Si
]
. (13)
Though it seems difficult to justify on theoretical grounds, assumption 2 is fortunately
testable. We use placebo test that consists in applying the identification strategy between
two pre-treatment years, t′ and t′′, where no effect should be detected.17 Indeed, assump-
tion 2 implies that equation (13) holds with t replaced by t′′. We implement this test by
setting t′′ = 2003: the program is already in place at that date, but not all farmers have
entered it. We use the farmers entering after 2003 to build the placebo test.
Assumption 2 also implies that the rates of adoption of practices are the same for the
participants and their observationally identical counterparts. A reasonable alternative
assumption would therefore imply that participants adopt practices at a quicker pace
16The conditionality of direct subsidies to the implantation of grass buffer-strips is a case in point.
17Placebo tests were first implemented by Heckman and Hotz [21] in the context of the evaluation of
job training programs. They have become widely-used robustness tests for the validity of a DID design
(see for example Duflo [18]) and part of what Angrist and Krueger [9] call refutability tests.
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than non-participants. One way to do this is to replace part (iii) of assumption 2 by Y 0it =
l0(Ti, Ii,Si,µi, δi, eit,nit)+m0(pQt , pYt , wt, Ti, Ii,Si, eit,nit)+ tk0(Ti, Ii,Si,µi, δi, eit,nit),
for functions l0, m0 and k0. Assumption 2 implies conditional independence in the rate
of increase of the practices:
E
[
Y 0it − Y 0it′
t− t′ −
Y 0it − Y 0it′′
t− t′′ |Di = 1, Ti, Ii,Si
]
= E
[
Y 0it − Y 0it′
t− t′ −
Y 0it − Y 0it′′
t− t′′ |Di = 0, Ti, Ii,Si
]
, (14)
Under this assumption, the matching version of the triple-differences (DDD) estimator of
Heckman and Hotz [21] yields an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. We implement
this estimator as an additional robustness check.
The common support assumption
Finally, in order to apply the DID-matching estimator, there must exist non-participants
having the same observed characteristics T , I and S for each participant. The prob-
ability of not entering an AES must be strictly positive for all values of the observed
characteristics. A sufficient condition for this to hold is:
Assumption 3. Pr(V > E [V1 − V0|I] |T, I,S) > 0.
Assumption 3 states that, for each level of the observed variables, some farmers have
participation costs higher than the expected utility of entering the AES program. The set
of values of I and S for which this assumption is satisfied is called the zone of common
support [22].
This assumption has empirical content because among households with the same
expected utility gain from entering the AES, some have relatively higher participation
costs V because of relatively less substantial assistance from public administrations at the
local level. In each of the 95 French départements, there exists a Chambre d’Agriculture
(CA) representing local farmers’ unions. One of the missions of the CAs is to provide
assistance to farmers willing to enter an AES. For political reasons, some CAs have chosen
to support the AES program while others have not. This has resulted in wide variations
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in the cost of applying to the AES program over the period studied, which have translated
into different take-up rates across départements. The main reasons for CA motivation
relate to the relative political influence of cattle and crop farmers at the département
level [12]. V acts thus as an unobserved instrumental variable: it determines treatment
intake but is uncorrelated to time-varying determinants of potential outcomes.18,19
As a conclusion to this section, under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, DID-matching identifies
the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT ):
ATT = E
[
E
[
Y 1it − Y 0it′ |Di = 1, Ti, Ii,Si
]
− E
[
Y 0it − Y 0it′|Di = 0, Ti, Ii,Si
]]
. (15)
3.3 Definition of treatment effects with multiple treatments
In practice, farmers can choose among several AESs and may combine some of them.
This makes no difference with respect to the way we have encoded our identification
assumptions, but it requires some care in defining treatment effects. Let’s suppose that
there are two AESs, a and b, that farmers can enter either separately or jointly. AES
a (resp. b) is designed by assumption to alter practice Ya (resp. b). Da (resp. Db) is a
random variable equal to one when a farmer chooses to enter AES a (resp. b) and zero
otherwise. We can define four potential outcomes for each practice j ∈ {a, b}:
Yj =

Y 11j if Dj = 1 and D−j = 1
Y 10j if Dj = 1 and D−j = 0
Y 01j if Dj = 0 and D−j = 1
Y 00j if Dj = 0 and D−j = 0,
(16)
18Note that in our framework, we do not need V to be independent of (µ, δ): it is thus not an instrument
for the level of agricultural practices but for their increments.
19In our setting, a zone of common support may exist even in the absence of an unobserved exogenous
instrument. Variation in the expected unobserved net returns to the program, due to the unobserved (by
us) fixed through time determinants of profits (productivity, tastes) is enough to generate variation in
participation behavior. This variation is endogenous in the sense that it is correlated with the potential
outcomes, but only through the unobserved fixed through time determinants. Because under the assump-
tion of independence of increments, we can difference out the effect of these determinants, participation
is not correlated to the increments in potential outcomes, thereby generating common support.
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where D−j refers to the AES that is not j (i.e. −j = b when j = a).
Because we have access to data on individual AESs, we want to decompose the effect
of each AES taken separately, with the aim of doing a cost-benefit analysis for each AES.
We also want to focus on the impact of a given AES on the practice it aimed at altering.
But farmers generally enter various AESs at the same time, making it difficult to separate
out the effect of various AESs and to define a given treatment effect.
In practice, we say that a farmer benefits from AES a if she receives payments at
least for this AES (she may also receive payments for other AESs). We define a farmer
as being untreated if she receives no payment at all for any AES. So rigorously, the
treatment effect we estimate is the average effect of taking AES a (and any other AES
that in practice has been associated to it) on the practice it was meant to alter relative
to taking no AES at all, for the farmers that take AES a:
ATTa = E
[
Ya − Y 00a |Da = 1
]
(17)
= E
[
Y 11a Db + Y 10a (1−Db)− Y 00a |Da = 1
]
(18)
= E
[
Y 11a − Y 00a |Db = 1, Da = 1
]
Pr(Db = 1|Da = 1)
+ E
[
Y 10a − Y 00a |Db = 0, Da = 1
]
Pr(Db = 0|Da = 1). (19)
This parameter is a weighted average of the treatment effect of AES a and b taken
together and of AES a taken alone on the respective subpopulations. In order to use this
parameter in cost-benefit analysis, we make the assumption that only AES a (resp. b)
matters for practice Ya (resp. Yb):
Assumption 4 (No cross-effects). For j ∈ {a, b}, Y 10j = Y 11j = Y 1j and Y 00j = Y 01j = Y 0j .
Under this assumption, there is no indirect effect of AES b on Ya, and thus there
are no complementarities between AESs a and b. We can thus proceed to a separate
cost-benefit analysis for each AES because we have:
ATTa = E
[
Y 1a − Y 0a |Da = 1
]
. (20)
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This assumption has some empirical content, so it can be tested:
• First, we can test whether there is a direct effect of AES b on Ya by estimating
whether E [Y 01a − Y 00a |Db = 1, Da = 0] is equal to zero.
• Second, we can test whether there is any additional effect of AES b on top of AES
a by estimating E [Y 11a − Y 10a |Db = 1, Da = 1].
4 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a longitudinal data set constructed from a statistical
survey on agricultural practices conducted in 2003 and 2005 by the statistical services
of the French ministry of Agriculture (named “STRU” 20) paired to both the 2000 Cen-
sus of Agriculture (“CA-2000”) and several administrative files recording information on
the participation in the AES between 2000 and 2006. The data in “STRU-2005” are
used to measure post-treatment outcomes, those in “CA-2000” are used to build both
pre-treatment outcomes and control variables, and the data in “STRU-2003” serves for
the robustness tests. This is an original database built especially for this work. Its con-
struction involved a pairing procedure based on several steps because of the scattering of
data.21 The sample extracted from “STRU” is representative of French farmers.
4.1 Definition of the participation variables
For each AES, participation is a binary variable taking a value of one when the surveyed
farmer appears in administrative files as receiving subsidies compensating him for coping
with the requirements of the AES between 2001 and 2005, and a value of zero when the
surveyed farmer does not appear in the administrative between 2000 and 2005. The few
20The extensive name of this survey is: Enquête sur la Structure des Exploitations.
21The construction of the database is extensively described in appendix C in the supplementary mate-
rial. We pair administrative data on AES recipients to farm surveys. The pairing algorithm is extremely
accurate (98% of the treated farmers are correctly identified). There nevertheless are a few recipient
farms that we cannot identify and we may wrongly attribute an AES to a few non-recipient farms. This
measurement error may yield some attenuation bias, so that our estimates are lower bounds on treatment
effects.
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farmers receiving an AES before 2001 are excluded from the sample, because no pre-
treatment observation exists for them. Because farmers may benefit from several AES,
the participation variables partially overlap. Table 1 shows that roughly half the farmers
Table 1: Overlap between the AES studied in the paper
0301 09 08 04 0201 0205 21 PHAE
09 903
08 770 1 980
04 591 775 797
0201 203 201 217 206
0205 53 119 130 125 9
21 77 118 94 64 45 9
PHAE 46 114 92 11 10 57 65
AESs 19 and 20 33 133 106 16 8 1 87 308
taking AES 0301 also take AES 09, 40 % of the farmers taking AES 04 also contract AES
0301, 60 % of the farmers entering AES 08 also take AES 09 and 50 % of the farmers
taking AES 0201 also take AES 0301. AES 0205 and 21 on the contrary are not generally
highly associated with other AESs. This is generally not a problem because the AES
that are correlated with each other aim at influencing different practices. When two AES
may have an impact on the same outcome variable, we study their effect separately by
focusing on the sets of participants that only benefit from each one of them.22
Table 2 reports the sample size and the number of participants for the AES we study
in this paper. The sample contains between 400 to 3,000 participants depending on the
AES, which represents between 2,000 and 14,000 participant farmers nationwide. We also
have access to almost 60,000 non-participants, representing 540,000 farmers nationwide.
22There are also three different kinds of widely adopted treatments that may confound the effect of our
AES. The first is the first component of the CAP, composed of direct subsidies. Every farmer is entitled
to these payments, and they only depend on farm structure, so that by controlling on farm structure,
we compare farmers having the same level of these payments. A second problem is the introduction of
an indemnity for covering the soil in winter in one region in France during the period under study. We
exclude farmers benefiting from this subsidy from our sample. Finally, the AES subsidizing extensive
herding (AES 19, 20 and PHAE) have been very widely adopted. Notice from table 1 that these AESs
do not overlap with the ones we study (that mostly concern cereal growers). We nevertheless re-estimate
treatment effects after excluding those benefiting from AESs 19 and 20 and PHAE, and find no difference
in treatment effects. We thank an anonymous referee for inviting us to clarify this point.
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Table 2: Sample sizes and AES participation
AES Restriction imposed Treated CS(a) Non treated Sample
0301 Implanting cover crops 1,811 1,617 58,951 60,568
09 Reduction of fertilizer use 3,173 2,824 58,951 61,775
08 Reduction of pesticides use 3,197 2,849 58,951 61,800
04 Implanting grass buffer strips 1,532 1,356 58,951 60,307
0201 Adding one more crop to the rotation 446 382 58,951 59,333
0205 Having at least 4 crops in the rotation 1,844 1,635 58,951 60,586
21 Conversion to organic farming 720 536 58,951 59,487
Notes : (a) CS refers to the estimated number of treated on the common support, i.e. effectively used
in the estimations. Details of its calculation can be found in appendix B.
4.2 Definition of the outcome variables
The average treatment effect on the treated is estimated for five AES. Several outcome
variables are associated with each AES. Two outcome variables allow us to estimate
the impact of the measures 03 and 04 which aim at reducing nitrogen carrying by rain
drainage: the land area dedicated to cover crops for soil nitrate recovery and the length of
fertilizer-free grass buffer strips located at the edge of agricultural fields which attenuate
nitrate lixiviation. As cover crops may be a way to retain nitrogen during winter, we study
whether farmers participating in AES 09 aimed at curbing the use of nitrogen fertilizers
have an increased use of cover-crops, even when they are not participating in AES 03. The
impact of AES 02 encouraging crop diversification is measured on four outcome variables:
the area dedicated to the main crop and the proportion of the total usable arable area
(UAA) it covers, the number of crops, and a crop diversity index.23 Finally, we use two
outcome variables to estimate the impact of the measures, which aim at encouraging
conversion to organic agriculture: the land area dedicated to organic farming and the
land area under conversion. All areas are measured in hectares. Pre-treatment outcomes
are extracted from “CA-2000” and “STRU-2003”, the main exceptions being the area
cultivated under organic farming and the area covered by grass buffer-strips. The former
has not been measured in 2000 while the latter has only been measured in 2005. As a
consequence, the effect of AESs 04 and 21 on these two variables is estimated by simple
23We use a regularity index, which is an evenness measure of crop diversity, independent of the number
of crops and dependent solely on the distribution of land area among the crops.
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matching. Validity of treatment effect estimates for these two AES thus relies on the
assumption of no selection on unobservables. This is likely to be a minor problem because
the eligibility to AES 21 was conditional on not having any area cultivated under organic
farming in 2000, so that non-participants had higher areas under organic farming in 2000:
matching gives thus a lower bound on the effect of the treatment. We perform a placebo
test of this assumption by applying the identification strategy in the pre-treatment year
2003.
4.3 Definition of control variables
Crucial for the relevance of both matching and DID-matching identification strategies is
the set of pre-treatment observed variables we use to select non-participants observation-
ally identical to participants. The richness of the information in our database enables us
to control for most of the important determinants of input choices and selection into the
program listed in our theoretical model. We have data on production factors (equipment,
buildings, herd size and composition, composition and size of UAA, size of the labor force,
age and education level of farm associates, etc.), and on the consumption side (composi-
tion of the household, the main non-farm activity of the farmer and his spouse, etc.). The
dataset also includes measures of technical orientation of the farm, labels of quality, past
experience with the previous AESs (1993-1999) and other agricultural policies.24 The
main unobserved variables are thus managerial ability, ecological preferences and prices.
Almost all our control variables are measured at the farm level. The only exceptions
are the variables measuring altitude, slope, agro-environmental zone and soil carbon
content, that are measured at the commune level,25 for want of measures at the farm level.
We use mean altitude and slope at the commune level to approximate these variables at
the farm level. Communes are sufficiently small entities that this approximation does not
entail a lot of error.
24The extensive list of the variables is not presented but can be found in appendix D in the supple-
mentary material.
25A French commune is roughly equivalent to a US county. There are approximately 36,000 communes
in France.
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5 Results
In this section, we first present the practical implementation of DID-matching, and then
present and discuss the results of this estimation procedure. We finally present the results
of the robustness checks based on testing for SUTVA, placebo tests and DDD estimates.
5.1 Practical implementation of DID-matching
The procedure we use is in line with the most recent developments in the literature
on program evaluation as they are presented in Todd [48]. As they are not a genuine
contribution of this paper, the econometric methods used are presented in appendix B.
The first step of the estimation procedure is an estimation of a probit participation
model for each AES, where control variables are included as explanatory variables.26,27
We generally find that participants are indeed different from non-participants: they are
younger, more educated, work longer hours on larger farms, and are more likely to have
had a previous experience with an AES. Whereas previous experience with quality labels
tend to increase participation in AES 21, technical orientation toward growing cereals
increases participation in all the AESs studied in this paper except AES 21. Overall,
these results suggest an important selection on observables and are coherent with previous
empirical studies of the determinants of participation in these AESs [17].
We also estimate the probability of participating in a given AES, conditional on the
control variables (i.e. the propensity score). Following Smith and Todd [45], we define
the zone of common support as the set of participants for which there exists a sufficient
density of non-participants with the same value for the propensity score.28,29 As shown
in table 2, restriction to the zone of common support generally reduces the number of
recipient farms by 10%. The maximum is reached with AES 21, for which a quarter of the
26The extensive results are not presented but they can be found in appendix E in the supplementary
material.
27As the validity of our estimates depends on our correct specification of the participation model,
we test our parametric specifications of against a nonparametric alternative using the specification test
proposed by Shaikh, Simonsen, Vytlacil, and Yildiz [44]. Results do not reject the null that the model
is correctly specified.
28The definition of the zone of common support is provided in more detail in appendix B.
29The graphs presenting the zone of common support for each AES are not shown but they can be
found in appendix F in the supplementary material.
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recipient farms have no untreated counterpart. In order to understand how the farms on
the common support differ from the average recipient farm, we run probit regressions for
the presence on the common support. Results indicate that recipient farmers remaining
on the common support are older and have smaller farms and a lower education level
than recipient farmers that are not on the common support.30
DID-matching amounts to applying the matching procedure to first-differenced out-
come variables: in our application, the change in outcomes between 2005 and 2000.31.
The matching estimators we use consists in predicting the counterfactual level of out-
come of participants, from the level of outcomes of non-participants who have similar
levels of the control variables.32 We assess the quality of the matching procedure by
comparing the mean level of the control variables for the participants to that of their
matched counterparts. Results show that differences of covariates among participants
and non-participants are largely removed, meaning that the matching can be considered
successful.33
Results from three DID-matching estimators are presented: the nearest-neighbor esti-
mator based on a multivariate matching (NNM(1)); the nearest-neighbor estimator based
on a univariate matching on the propensity score (NNM(2)); and the local linear matching
estimator based on the propensity score (LLM). The details of the estimation procedures
are presented in appendix B.34 We mainly report and comment the results from LLM,
known as the most efficient, but both NNM estimators yield similar results. We estimate
30We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this test.
31Note that treatment effects may depend on the time elapsed since the farmer entered the AES. We
do not expect these vintage effects to be important, though, because the farmers have to cope with all
the requirements of the AES from the beginning, and there is thus not a lot of scope for learning. We test
this possibility by estimating, in 2003 and 2005, the treatment effect of various AES on farmers having
entered the schemes before 2003. As expected we do not find evidence of strong vintage or learning
effects: treatment effects mostly remain constant through time. The results are available upon request.
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we study vintage effects.
32See Imbens [26] for a detailed presentation of the various matching methods.
33As suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin [39], we use standardized differences to assess the quality of
our adjustment. Before matching, there are around 80 variable that exhibit large differences, whereas
there is at most one large difference after matching with LLR. On the basis of these results, we can
accept the fact that our LLR matching procedure is precise. The extensive results of the balancing tests
are not presented but they can be found in appendix G in the supplementary material. We thank an
anonymous referee for suggesting we implement balancing tests.
34NNM procedures use the four closest non-recipient neighbors of each recipient farms to build the
counterfactual level of the practice. We implement LLM using an Epanechnikov kernel and we set
bandwidth to .05. Setting a lower bandwidth of .02 yields similar results.
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standard errors for LLM by using a bootstrap procedure. Abadie and Imbens [6] having
shown that bootstrapping fails for NNM, we report Abadie and Imbens [5]’s asymptotic
standard errors.35
5.2 Average treatment effect on the treated estimated by DID-
matching
Table 3 reports the LLM estimates of direct and cross effects of each AES on agricultural
practices. Cross effects are estimated by focusing on farmers not receiving the AES having
a direct effect on the practice, i.e. they correspond to E [Y 01a − Y 00a |Db = 1, Da = 0].36
Table 4 displays the corresponding changes in the outcome variables for the treatment
and control groups computed using NNM1, only for direct effects. We first discuss the
effects of the AESs on crop diversity, then on carrying of pollutants (cover crops and
grass buffer strips) and on conversion to organic farming.
Effects of the AESs on crop diversification
Two AES are likely to directly affect crop diversification: AES 0201, which consists in
introducing one new crop in the rotation, and AES 0205, which requires having at least
four different crops in the rotation. Unlike the case above, recipients of AES 0201 are
different from recipients of the less ambitious AES 0205. As a matter of fact, results
suggest that AES 0201 has generally had a stronger impact on outcome variables than
AES 0205 (table 3), although there are fewer participants in AES 0201 (table 2). These
impacts are generally estimated precisely (ATTs are different from zero at the 1 per cent
level of significance). Results suggest that AES 0201 (resp. 0205) has increased the crop
diversity index by .05 (resp. .03). This is not a strong effect, the diversity index varying
from 0 to 1. On the contrary, these AESs have larger effects on the number of crops in
35Chabé-Ferret [14] shows that controlling on pre-treatment outcomes may bias DID-matching esti-
mates. As a robustness check, we run DID-matching without controlling for pre-treatment outcomes and
find similar results.
36We have also estimated E
[
Y 11a − Y 10a |Db = 1, Da = 1
]
, but estimates are imprecise because of low
sample size. We nevertheless have enough power to reject cross effects of AESs other than 0301 on the
planting of cover crops.
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the rotation: they are responsible for the addition of a almost one crop to the rotation
(.85 for 0201 and .65 for 0205). These contrasting results can be reconciled by noting
that these AESs have had a very limited effect on the area covered by the main crop: it
has only decreased by apprximately 2 ha, i.e. only 3 % of UAA. Most of the rotation has
thus remained unchanged and the additional crop has been planted on a limited area.
Table 4 further shows that the difference in the crop diversity index between groups is
mainly due to a decrease in the crop diversity index for matched non-participants.
Cross effects of other AESs are generally lower than direct effects. All AESs seem to
slightly increase the number of crops on the farm. AES 21 promoting organic farming
adds .58 crops to the farm. Other AESs increase the diversity index, but they do not
decrease the area covered by the main crop.
Table 3: Direct and cross effects of various AESs
0201 0205 0301 04 08 09 21
Eveness .05∗ .03 .02∗∗∗ .03∗∗∗ .02∗∗ .02∗∗∗ .07∗∗∗
(.03) (.02) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.02)
Number of crops .85∗∗ .65∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗ .37∗∗∗ .22∗∗∗ .20∗∗∗ .58∗∗∗
(.36) (0.23) (.07) (.07) (.04) (.05) (.14)
Area under main -.03 -.03∗∗∗ -.006∗ -.01∗∗∗ .002 -.0007 -.01
crop (%UAA) (.03) (.01) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.01)
Area under main -2.30∗ -1.51∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ -.68 2.23∗∗∗ 2.20∗∗∗ 2.71∗∗
crop (ha) (1.34) (.58) (.41) (.62) (.36) (.35) (1.19)
Cover crops (ha) 1.04 1.08∗∗∗ 10.66∗∗∗ .23 -.01 .20 .31
(.79) (.34) (1.32) (.38) (.54) (.60) (.35)
Grass buffer -119.91∗ 192.45∗∗∗ -7.49 243.61 13.54 30.60 -17.10
strips (m) (68.30) (44.64) (38.96) (149.24) (29.67) (28.35) (40.51)
Organic farming -13.39 -6.58 -5.13 11.12 -.50 7.49 46.41∗∗∗
(ha) (45.64) (15.09) (21.07) (26.33) (12.86) (18.93) (0.13)
Under conversion .30 3.96 -3.31∗ .08 -1.46 1.66 4.41∗
(ha) (2.57) (10.67) (1.85) (2.80) (1.73) (2.88) (2.52)
Note: results in bold are the estimates of the direct effect of each AES on the practice it is meant to alter.
Cross effects are estimated on the subgroup receiving AES b but not receiving AES a, the one aiming
at directly altering practice Y a. Estimations use LLM with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwith set
to .05. Standard errors are in parentheses and are estimated by 500 bootstrapped replications for direct
effects and 100 replications for cross-effects. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1 % (∗∗∗), 5 %
(∗∗) or 10 % (∗) level. UAA refers to Usable Agricultural Area.
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Effects of the AESs on the planting of cover crops and grass buffer strips
AES 0301, which subsidizes the introduction of cover crops in the UAA, and AES 04,
which subsidizes planting grass buffer strips, aim at decreasing the transfer of pollutants
(mainly nitrogen) to ground and surface water. Results displayed in table 3 show that
AES 0301 have increased the area planted in cover crops, the average treatment effect on
the treated being around 10 ha. Table 4 shows that, between 2000 and 2005, the area
planted in cover crop by farmers receiving AES 0301 has increased by 13 ha, while it has
increased by only 3 ha among similar non recipients.
The ATT for AES 04 has not been estimated using DID-estimators, the outcome
variable being unobserved in 2000. The ATT varies across estimators. The local linear
estimator suggests that participants in AES 04 have 240 more meters of grass buffer
strips than their matched counterparts (table 3), although this is estimated with a lack
of precision. Results presented in table 4 show that such a difference results from the
fact that participants’ strips are twice as long as those of non-participants. Anyway,
such impacts do not appear to be large, compared to the total of all grass buffer strips
in France counted in 2005 (around 20,000 km), largely due to the eco-conditionality of
Common Agricultural Policy direct subsidies.
Table 4: Unadjusted means of outcome variables in differences (“STRU-2005”)
Outcome AES Treated Controls ATT StdE
Main crop (% UAA) 0201 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 ∗∗∗ 0.00
Main crop (% UAA) 0205 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 ∗∗∗ 0.00
Crop diversity index 0201 0.01 -0.05 0.05 ∗∗∗ 0.01
Crop diversity index 0205 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 ∗∗∗ 0.00
Number of crops 0201 0.55 -0.31 0.77 ∗∗∗ 0.08
Number of crops 0205 0.49 -0.25 0.69 ∗∗∗ 0.04
Cover crops (hectares) 0301 13.89 2.84 10.66 ∗∗∗ 0.18
Grass Buffer Strips (meters) 04 1018.40 553.68 423.64 ∗∗∗ 24.14
Organic land area (hectares) 21 50.10 3.54 47.18 ∗∗∗ 0.60
Under conversion (hectares) 21 4.48 0.01 4.47 ∗∗∗ 0.04
Note: The ATT is estimated using the nearest neighbor estimator NNM(1) based on multivariate
matching. The difference of means of outcome variables between treated and control groups does
not correspond precisely to the estimated ATT displayed in column 5, as the nearest neighbor pro-
cedure involved a bias-corrected step. StdE stand for standard errors. Asterisks denote statistical
significance at 1 % (∗∗∗), 5 % (∗∗) or 10 % (∗) level. UAA refers to Usable Agricultural Area.
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We find evidence that the assumption of no cross-effects is supported by the data
in the case of cover crops. AESs other than 0301 have no effect on the implantation of
cover crops. AESs 0201 and 0205 have the largest cross effect: a very narrow increase of
1 ha of cover crops. We also find that AESs other than 04, 0201 and 0205 do not have
any significant effect on the planting of grass buffer strips, thereby largely confirming the
absence of cross effects. The positive effects of AES 0205 may indicate that some farmers
have used cover crops or grass buffer strips to increase crop diversity on their farms.
Effects of the AESs on the conversion to organic farming
As in the case of the AES 04, the ATT for the AES 21, which consists in encouraging
the adoption of organic farming practices, has not been estimated using DID estimators,
because the outcome variable is unobserved in 2000. As already argued, this is not
likely to lead to a large bias since farmers entering this AES where required to have no
area cultivated in organic farming. If anything, matching estimates should thus lead to
a lower bound on the treatment effect. Results suggest a rather important impact of
AES 21 on the area dedicated to organic farming and the area under conversion. Table 3
shows a difference between the treated and control groups close to 46 ha in the area fully
converted to organic agriculture, and a difference of 4.5 ha in the area in the process of
conversion. Table 4 further shows that such a gap is mainly due to the land area under
organic farming being much larger for participants than for their matched counterparts.
Furthermore, we do not detect significant cross effects of other AESs on organic farming.
In view of these results, the AES 21 appears to be the cause of 90% of the increase in
area devoted to organic farming between 2000 and 2005.
5.3 Robustness checks: diffusion effects, placebo tests and DDD
estimates
In this section, we present the results of the tests of the the validity of our identifying
assumptions. We focus in turn on diffusion effects, placebo tests and DDD matching
estimates.
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Tests of the validity of Assumption 1 (no diffusion effects)
We test for the validity of SUTVA by adding the initial proportion of organic farmers,
and farmers implanting cover crops, in the farmer’s canton as control variables. A canton
is larger than a commune (it usually is made of 3 to 5 of them) and thus likely represents
the extent of a farmer’s zone of influence. Adding this control variable barely changes
our estimated treatment effects for organic farming (45.5 ha) and implantation of cover
crops (10.5 ha). We take this as evidence that SUTVA is not rejected by the data.
Tests of the validity of assumption 2: placebo tests
Placebo tests consist in applying the DID-matching estimator to post-2003 participants
outcomes. Indeed, no effect should be detected for these treated groups.
However, these tests are disrupted by anticipation effects due to the unusually long
period of time taken to process administrative applications in 2003. That is why we
perform these tests on groups of future participants that enter the program at dates pro-
gressively farther away from September 2003. If our interpretation of anticipation effects
is correct, and if the identification assumptions behind DID-matching are fulfilled, we
should observe a progressive decrease in the placebo effect the further away participation
takes place, and we should obtain a zero effect after some time. Results are presented in
table 5.
For AES 0201, the average treatment effects on the number of crops, on the main
crop area, and on the crop diversity index cannot be estimated with a high level of
precision but overall the estimated average treatment effects appear to be small. On the
contrary, for AES 0205, the number of crops exhibits a decreasing time trend coherent
with anticipation behavior.
For AES 0301, the average treatment effect on the cover crop area that we estimate
in 2003 on the post-September 2003 group of participants remains around 3 ha until
we apply the estimator to the post-September 2005 group of participants. The average
treatment effect then falls to 1 ha, without being statistically different from zero. Such
results corroborate the idea of anticipatory behavior due to administrative delays. Results
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are similar for AES 09. For the AES 21, results conform to the same profile, except
that anticipation is very high but drops more rapidly: it is halved between March and
September 2004. Results for participants who enter the AES later become imprecise due
to smaller sample size.
Table 5: Results of the placebo tests
Sample
post- post- post- post- post-
Outcome AES Sept03 Mar04 Sept04 Mar05 Sept05
Main crop 0201 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 ∗ n.a.
(% UAA) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (n.a.)
Main crop 0205 -0.01 ∗∗∗ -0.01 ∗∗∗ -0.01 ∗∗∗ -0.01 ∗ n.a.
(% UAA) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (n.a.)
Crop diversity 0201 0.03 ∗∗ 0.02 0.03 0.03 n.a.
index (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (n.a.)
Crop diversity 0205 0.02 ∗∗∗ 0.02 ∗∗∗ 0.01 ∗∗∗ 0.02 ∗ n.a.
index (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (n.a.)
Number of 0201 0.21 0.09 0.21 -0.12 n.a.
crops (0.19) (0.19) (0.28) (0.31) (n.a.)
Number of 0205 0.33 ∗∗∗ 0.33 ∗∗∗ 0.35 ∗∗∗ 0.19 n.a.
crops (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.19) (n.a.)
Cover crops 0301 3.52 ∗∗∗ 3.60 ∗∗∗ 3.14 ∗∗∗ 3.34 ∗∗∗ 1.32
(ha) (0.60) (0.60) (0.69) (0.80) (1.02)
Organic land 21 6.71 ∗∗∗ 4.91 ∗∗ 5.90 ∗∗ 5.58 n.a.
area (ha) (2.53) (2.35) (2.65) (4.13) (n.a.)
Conversion to 21 13.96 ∗∗∗ 15.58 ∗∗∗ 4.05 4.81 n.a.
organic (ha) (4.39) (4.52) (2.51) (4.02) (n.a.)
Note : asterisks denote statistical significance at 1 % (∗∗∗), 5 % (∗∗) or 10 % (∗) level. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Estimations use LLM with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwith set to
.05. Standard errors are in parentheses and are estimated by 500 bootstrapped replications. Details
on the estimation are presented in the appendix. Average treatment effects are estimated succes-
sively on the post-September 2003 participants’ group, the post-March 2004 participants’ group, the
post-September 2004 participants’ group, the post-March 2005 participants’ group, and the post-
September 2005 participants’ group. For AES 04 only, placebo-tests can not be applied because the
associated outcomes are not observed in 2003. UAA refers to Usable Agricultural Area.
Overall, results of the placebo tests confirm the importance of anticipation effects
and suggest small or null time-varying selection bias. These results are consistent with
our knowledge of the administrative procedure underlying the farmers’ participation in
the scheme and thus tend to support the chosen identification strategy based on DID-
matching. However, insofar as we cannot totally reject the hypothesis of a divergence
between the two groups, in addition to the anticipation effect, we also turn to the triple-
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difference matching estimator with a view to determining the lower bound of the effect
that we try to recover.
A lower bound on treatment effects: results from triple difference estimates
We apply the triple-difference estimator, which consists in correcting the DID-matching
estimates in 2005 by taking into account the divergence estimated in 2003 between the
participants and their matched counterparts. Note that the triple-difference estimator
then leads to a lower bound on the treatment effect, since it assumes that all the diver-
gence detected in 2003 is due to selection bias, which is not true.
Table 6: Average treatment effect on the treated for AES in 2005 using DDD-matching
DDD DID DID
Sep03-Mar05 Sep03-Mar05 whole sample
Outcome AES ATT(1) ATT(2) ATT(3)
Main crop (% UAA) 0201 -0.04 ∗∗∗ -0.05 ∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Main crop (% UAA) 0205 -0.01 -0.03 ∗∗∗ -0.03 ∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Crop diversity index 0201 -0.02 0.03 0.05 ∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Crop diversity index 0205 0.00 0.03 ∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Number of crops 0201 0.79 ∗∗ 1.05 ∗∗∗ 0.85 ∗∗
(0.38) (0.37) (0.36)
Number of crops 0205 0.07 0.67 ∗∗∗ 0.65 ∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.23)
Cover crops (ha) 0301 4.87 ∗∗∗ 10.46 ∗∗∗ 10.66 ∗∗∗
(1.26) (0.97) (1.32)
Organic land area 21 14.07 45.01 ∗∗∗ 50.82 ∗∗∗
(10.11) (6.98) (2.79)
Note : ATT(1) refers to the triple-difference estimates, ATT(2) refers to the DID-matching
estimates on the same sample (farmers who have entered the AES between September 2003
and March 2005), and ATT(3) refers to the DID-matching estimates on the whole sample
(farmers who have entered the AES before March 2005). UAA refers to Usable Agricultural
Area. Estimations use LLM with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwith set to .05. Standard
errors are in parentheses and are estimated by 500 bootstrapped replications.
Results of the triple-difference estimator are displayed in table 6. As we apply this es-
timator to a subset of the data (only participants entering the scheme between September
2003 and March 2005 are included in the sample), it could be that the ATT estimated
34
on this subpopulation is not representative of the treatment effect on the overall pop-
ulation of participants. In order to have an indication on the severity of this problem,
we re-estimate the ATT by DID-matching on this subpopulation. Results are in general
very close to the ones obtained on the overall population.
For AES 0201, the average treatment effect on the main crop area is a reduction of 4%,
whereas it is a reduction of 5% when estimated by applying DID-matching. Moreover,
the average treatment effect on the number of crops is an increase of 0.8, whereas it is an
increase of 1.05 when estimated by applying DID-matching. Such results thus indicate
that the lower bound for these effects remain very close to the DID-matching results.
For AES 0205, the triple-difference estimates suffer from a lack of precision. In any case,
this does not modify our conclusions on DID-matching estimates: the DID-matching
estimates being already very low, we actually expected very similar results from the
triple-difference estimator.
For AES 0301, DDD-matching gives an average treatment effect on the treated of
around 5 ha, while it is around 10 ha when estimated by applying the DID-matching
estimator. Although placebo tests clearly suggest that DID-matching should be preferred,
5 ha is a lower bound on the treatment effect, thereby confirming that this AES exhibits
significantly positive additionality effects. Finally, for AES 21, the triple-difference results
do not allow for a lower bound to be provided with precision. However, here again, in
accordance with the placebo test results, we can reasonably suppose that DID-matching
results must be preferred and we cannot exclude a large effect of this AES.
6 How much green for the buck? A tentative cost-
benefit analysis
In this section, we insert our estimates of additionality and windfall effects into a cost-
benefit framework. We analyze each AES separately, and we take into account direct
effects only, which is reasonable in view of the limited extent of cross effects among AESs
that we find. We first present a simple framework integrating ATT and windfall effects
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into a cost-benefit framework. We define a threshold in the cost/benefit ratio such that
the AES is efficient if the social benefit from the practice it promotes is superior to
that threshold. Second, we calculate this cost/benefit ratio for each of the AESs under
study. To do so, we combine our ATT estimates with data on costs extracted from the
administrative files. Third, we compare the cost/benefit threshold to estimates taken
from the literature of the social benefit generated by the various agricultural practices
we study. The results from these calculations are presented in table 7.
A framework for cost-benefit analysis
Under assumptions SUTVA and no cross-effects, the variation of social welfare due to
the implementation of a given AES can be measured by the sum of the compensating
variation of farmers and consumers. However, we do not study farmers’ surplus in this
paper, because we lack data on profits37 and thus focus on consumer’s surplus. We
adopt a taxpayer’s view on the program and we investigate sufficient conditions for the
program social benefits to exceed its costs. We assume that the benefit from a practice
is proportional to the average level of this practice.38
B measures the social benefit from on unit of the practice Y . The total benefit gen-
erated under the scheme is thus: E [Y 1|D = 1]B, where E [Y 1|D = 1] is the area under
the practice in the average treated farm when it receives treatment. We consider only
the direct costs of the program, i.e. direct payments to farmers. We thus disregard ad-
ministrative costs and deadweight loss due to taxation. Costs associated to the scheme
are thus per hectare payments (C) multiplied by total area for which the farmer receives
payment: E [Y p|D = 1]C. Y p, the area for which the farmer gets paid, can be differ-
ent from Y 1. It can be lower if the farmer declares more than what she implants or
higher if the total area under the practice is capped and there are increasing returns to
the practice at the farm level. When the treatment is implemented, the net benefit is
thus: E [Y 1|D = 1]B − E [Y p|D = 1]C. This has to be compared with the benefit that
37Because there is free entry into the program, we can reasonably suppose that the average farmer’s
surplus is positive. This is implied by our model, conditional on I.
38We thus disregard the potentially important question of the spatial distribution of treatment effects.
We leave this for further research.
36
would have been reached had the program not been implemented: E [Y 0|D = 1]B, where
E [Y 0|D = 1] is the counterfactual level of practice Y . Consumer surplus from the AES
is thus equal to:
CS = E
[
Y 1|D = 1
]
B − E [Y p|D = 1]C − E
[
Y 0|D = 1
]
B (21)
= E
[
Y 1|D = 1
]
B −
(
E
[
Y p − Y 1|D = 1
]
− E
[
Y 1 − Y 0|D = 1
]
− E
[
Y 0|D = 1
])
C
− E
[
Y 0|D = 1
]
B (22)
= E
[
Y 1 − Y 0|D = 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ATT
(B − C)−
E [Y p − Y 1|D = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
+E
[
Y 0|D = 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
W
C, (23)
After rearranging, equation (23) shows that consumer surplus depends on the level of
additionality of the program, measured by the ATT , and on the level of discrepancy or
declarative error E and the windfall effect W . The AES is cost-effective whenever the
social benefit B is superior to a threshold B∗, with:
B∗ = ATT +W + E
ATT
C (24)
where B∗ increases with W and E and decreases with ATT . This formulation empha-
sizes the mechanism by which the additional and windfall effects determine the cost-
effectiveness of an AES. French AESs are not designed to avoid windfall effects. A farmer
who chooses to participate in an AES commits to reach a certain level of the practice
but this may not require that she actually alters the practice to achieve compliance. In
extreme cases, the counterfactual level of practice meets the required level; it happens to
be the same in the presence of the scheme as that in the absence of scheme. In that case,
the ATT is null and the windfall effect is maximum. Note that B∗ is also a measure of
the cost/benefit ratio, i.e. the cost per hectare of additional treatment effect. Indeed,
The numerator of B∗ can is equal to total payments received by the average recipient of
an AES: (ATT +W + E)C = E [Y p1 |D = 1]C = P .
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Measuring the cost per hectare of additional treatment effects
As a first step toward a cost-benefit analysis, we calculate the cost per hectare of addi-
tional treatment effect (B∗) for the different AESs. We measure C directly by dividing
total payments by the total area under contract for each farmer. ATT comes from the
LLR estimates of the previous section. W is calculated as the difference between the
observed level of the practice and the ATT . E is the difference between the level of the
practice for which the farmer gets paid (i.e. the total area under the AES) and the level
we measure in the 2005 farm survey. As an intermediate step, we also calculate the cost
per hectare of observed area under the practice (C2), by dividing average payments by
the average observed area under the practice.39 As reported in table 7, in the case of
AES 0301 (implanting cover crops), the average area under contract (21 ha) is slightly
larger than what we actually measured from survey data (17 ha), which suggests that
some farmers committed to implant more cover crops than what they actually did.40 This
translates in a higher cost per observed (81e) than per declared (68e) implanted area.
Moreover, the additional treatment effect (11 ha) is equal to 60% of the implanted area
under cover crops, so that the windfall effect (6.58 ha) is large. Thus, almost 40% of the
implanted cover crops area would have been sown by participants, even in the absence of
AES 0301. Mechanically, this windfall effect translates into a larger cost per implanted
area than per subsidized area: we indeed estimate a cost of 131 e per additional hectare
of cover crops, while the mean premium for such AES is only 68 e per hectare.
In the case of AES 21, farmers converted more area to organic farming than what they
get paid for, so that E is negative. This is probably due to a combination of increasing
returns with an informal cap on subsidized area. The cost per implanted area is thus
lower than the cost per subsidized area. There is nevertheless a positive windfall effect:
in the end, the cost per additional treatment effect is slightly lower than the cost per
subsidized area. AES 21 is thus very cost-effective.
39For the sake of consistency, we focus on units lying on the common support.
40This discrepancy could also stem from the slight remaining measurement error in the AES vari-
able or from slightly different definitions of the area planted in cover crops between farm surveys and
administrative data.
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For grass buffer strips (AES 04), in order to compare our estimates to data from
administrative records, we convert the ATT into hectares, under the assumption that
a grass buffer strip is 10 meters wide. Surprisingly, the average area under contract
appears fives times larger than what data from survey suggest.41 Moreover, there is a
large windfall effect and thus a very small treatment effect. This translates into a cost of
almost 1800 e per additional ha of grass buffer strips, while the mean premium for such
AES is only 93 e per ha.
We cannot apply formula (23) to AESs 0201 and 0205 because payments are not tied
to a given practice. We calculate the cost per additional area not under the main crop.
AES 0201 (resp. 0205) reduces area under the main crop by 2.30 ha (resp. 1.51 ha)
on average. This translates into a cost per additional area not under the main crop of
990e/ha (resp. 2900e/ha).
Table 7: Cost-benefit analysis of various AESs on the average treated farm
AES 0201 0205 0301 04 21
Payment (e) (P ) 2 271 4 356 1 392 421 7 667
Area under contract (ha)
(E [Y p|D = 1])
13.50 124.75 20.54 4.51 47.20
Observed area under the practice (ha)
(E [Y 1|D = 1])
17.24 1.02 54.71
Declarative error (ha) (E) 3.30 3.49 -7.51
Additional treatment effect (ha) (ATT ) 2.30 1.51 10.66 0.24 50.82
Windfall effect (ha) (W ) 6.58 0.78 3.89
Cost per area under contract (C) 168 35 68 93 162
Cost per area under the practice (C2) 81 413 140
Cost per unit of additional treatment
effect (B∗)
987.37 2884.77 131 1 754 151
Social benefit per unit of additional
treatment effect (B)
0.7*Na 1.6*Nb 540
Note: we cannot apply formula (23) to AESs 0201 and 0205 because payments are not tied to a given
practice. We calculate the cost per additional area not under the main crop, obtained from estimates
not presented in the previous sections. Na is the number of units of N-fertilizer whose leaching is
prevented by one hectare of cover crops. Nb is the number of units of N-fertilizer whose runoff is
prevented by one meter of grass buffer strips. Sample: treated farms on the common support.
41We do not think that this discrepancy can be explained by measurement error in the AES variable,
because remaining measurement error is quite small. This discrepancy may of course be due to an
underestimation of the strip width. And yet, we cannot reasonably suppose that grass buffer strips are
50 meters wide on average - although we are not able to check this from available data. People in charge
of conducting the farm surveys acknowledged that there is a large measurement error in the measure of
the length of grass buffer strips. This is the most likely explanation of the large discrepancy we find.
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Toward a cost-benefit analysis
In order to achieve a complete cost-benefit analysis, we have to compare the unit costs
to estimates of the social benefit of the practices promoted by each AESs. In table 7,
we provide estimates of the social benefit B taken from the literature. Subsidizing the
conversion to organic farming appears highly cost effective: it costs 151 e per hectare,
whereas average social benefit from organic farming is usually thought to be higher.
Indeed, Sandhu, Wratten, Cullen, and Case [42] estimate the average benefit of organic
farming relative to conventional farming to be of 540 e per hectare per year.42 According
to these figures, the benefits from implementing AES 21 would largely offset its cost.
On the contrary, the comparison of the costs of AES 0301 subsidizing the planting of
cover crops cost (131 e per additional hectare) to an estimate of the social cost of one
kilogram of N-fertilizer leaching from the field provided by van Grinsven, Rabl, and de Kok
[49] - 0.7 e per kg - suggests a poor cost-efficiency of AES 0301. Indeed, achievement
of cost-efficiency for this AES would require that one hectare of cover crops prevents
the leaching of 187 kg of N-fertilizer, which seems highly unrealistic. However, taking
into account the value of avoided phosphorus leaching and of increased biological and
landscape diversity could improve the cost-effectiveness of this measure.
We calculate that subsidizing the implantation of grass buffer strips costs 1800 e per
additional ha. Lankoski and Ollikainen [30] uses an estimate of 1.6 e per kg of N-
fertilizer for the social cost from nitrogen runoff. To reach cost-effectiveness, buffer strips
have thus to prevent the runoff of 1.1 kg of N-fertilizer per meter. Grass buffer strips have
a very high reported efficiency at curbing nitrogen runoffs. Cost-effectiveness of this AES
depends thus on the size of the watershed that leads to the buffer strip. For example, with
an assumed 80% efficiency of the buffer strip and runoffs of 14 kgN/ha, one kilometer of
a 10-m width buffer strip has to have a cropped watershed of 100 ha to ensure that social
benefits from this AES exceed its costs. Moreover, we should account for reduced runoff
of phosphorus and pesticides and for increased biodiversity. It thus seems that despite
high associated windfall effects, AES 04 could very well be cost-effective.
42We use an exchange rate of $1.5 per e. Their estimate is $810 per hectare and per year.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the causal effects of various French AESs subsidizing the adop-
tion of practices more favorable to the environment. We use DID-matching to estimate
the causal effects of each separate AES. We argue that the economics of the program
make it likely that the identifying assumptions of DID-matching hold in our data. We
also test and find support for the validity of these assumptions. We also examine cross
effects of the AESs on practices there were not meant to alter and find that these effects
are smaller than the direct effects, and generally null.
Overall, we find that the French AESs are characterized by large windfall effects. The
AESs subsidizing crop diversity are taken by farmers that have very diverse rotations at
the beginning of the program. They add on average a little less than one more crop to
the rotation thanks to the AES, but they do so on a very limited portion of their farm.
Therefore, the effect of the AESs promoting crop diversity on a crop diversity index and
on the area planted in the main crop is small. We estimate that the AES subsidizing
the planting of cover crops suffers from a 40 % windfall effect.43 The cost-effectiveness
of this AES is thus low: we estimate that, with this AES, it costs 131 e to induce the
planting of one hectare of cover crops, almost doubling the average cost per subsidized
area planted in cover crops (68 e/ha). Compared with estimates of social benefits from
avoided nitrogen leaching taken from the literature, the benefits from this AES does not
appear to be higher than its costs. According to our estimates, the AES subsidizing
the planting of grass buffer strips suffer from a 75 % windfall effect. Despite its very
low cost-effectiveness at increasing the planting of grass buffer strips, the social benefit
from this AES may very well be positive at least in some part of France because of the
very high efficiency of grass buffer strips at curbing nitrogen runoffs. Finally, according
to our results, the AES subsidizing the conversion to organic farming appears to be
highly cost-effective and to increase social welfare. Indeed, this AES has low windfall
effects. We estimate that the cost per additional hectare converted to of organic farming
thanks to this AES is of 151 e/ha. This is much lower than the estimates of the social
43Note that we do not include the declarative error in our measure of the windfall effect.
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benefits from organic farming estimated by Sandhu, Wratten, Cullen, and Case [42]:
540 e/ha. Apart from the large social benefits from organic farming, the source of the
high cost-effectiveness of this AES resides in the stringency of its eligibility conditions.
Indeed, only non organic farmers could benefit from this AES. According to our estimates,
conversions to organic farming due to this AES account for 90 % of the almost doubling
of the area farmed organically in France between 2000 and 2005. The French government
has recently increased the total amount dedicated to these subsidies. At the same time,
eligibility to these subsidies has been extended to all organic farmers, whatever their date
of conversion. This may jeopardize the reported high efficiency of this AES by opening
up the possibility for windfall effects. This new policy could nevertheless have a positive
effect on the duration of the conversion to organic farming.
We have not been able to estimate whether farmers went back to conventional farming
at the end of their 5-year contract because of the insufficient time scale of our data. We
leave this for further research. Another research direction we are currently exploring is
using variations in the level of assistance received by farmers across départements in an
instrumental variable strategy.44 Much remains to be done to improve the insertion of
treatment effects estimates into a fully-fledged cost-benefit framework. Estimating farm-
ers’s surplus from the AES would be a first step. More importantly, the environmental
effect of greener practices might vary through space. Estimating the spatial distribution of
treatment effects is thus an interesting avenue for further research. Finally, estimating the
treatment effects of the AESs directly on the environment remains an essential but very
difficult undertaking. Kleĳn, Baquero, Clough, Diaz, Esteban, Fernandez, Gabriel, Her-
zog, Holzschuh, Johl, Knop, Kruess, Marshall, Steffan-Dewenter, Tscharntke, Verhulst,
West, and Yela [29] provide evidence that AESs in the EU enhance common biodiversity.
To our knowledge, we lack the same type of evidence for the effects of AESs on water
quality. Recent work on very detailed Finnish data is a step in this direction [1].
44We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting we pursue in this direction.
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AES Treated CS(a) Non treated Sample
Panel B: used for placebo tests on the post-sep03 treated
0301 Implanting cover crops 741 655 58,586 59,241
09 Reduction of fertilizer use 467 405 58,586 58,991
08 Reduction of pesticides use 579 506 58,586 59,092
04 Implanting grass buffer strips 382 334 58,586 58,920
0201 Adding one more crop to the rotation 135 101 58,586 58,687
0205 Having at least 4 crops in the rotation 740 632 58,586 59,218
21 Conversion to organic farming 182 101 58,586 58,687
Panel C: used for placebo tests on the post-mar04 treated
0301 Implanting cover crops 727 641 58,586 59,227
09 Reduction of fertilizer use 448 387 58,586 58,973
08 Reduction of pesticides use 552 484 58,586 59,070
04 Implanting grass buffer strips 365 322 58,586 58,908
0201 Adding one more crop to the rotation 132 95 58,586 58,681
0205 Having at least 4 crops in the rotation 740 632 58,586 59,218
21 Conversion to organic farming 173 98 58,586 58,684
Panel D: used for placebo tests on the post-sep04 treated
0301 Implanting cover crops 543 472 58,586 59,058,
09 Reduction of fertilizer use 331 277 58,586 58,863
08 Reduction of pesticides use 418 366 58,586 58,952
04 Implanting grass buffer strips 239 203 58,586 58,789
0201 Adding one more crop to the rotation 88 53 58,586 58,639
0205 Having at least 4 crops in the rotation 736 627 58,586 59,213
21 Conversion to organic farming 106 54 58,586 58,640
Panel E: used for placebo tests on the post-mar05 treated
0301 Implanting cover crops 387 329 58,586 58,915
09 Reduction of fertilizer use 251 212 58,586 58,798
08 Reduction of pesticides use 338 291 58,586 58,877
04 Implanting grass buffer strips 170 140 58,586 58,726
0201 Adding one more crop to the rotation 68 30 58,586 58,616
0205 Having at least 4 crops in the rotation 164 120 58,586 58,706
21 Conversion to organic farming 71 29 58,586 58,615
Panel F: used for placebo tests on the post-sep05 treated
0301 Implanting cover crops 163 130 58,586 58,716
09 Reduction of fertilizer use 103 64 58,586 58,650
08 Reduction of pesticides use 118 80 58,586 58,666
04 Implanting grass buffer strips 57 16 58,586 58,602
0201 Adding one more crop to the rotation 21 0 58,586 58,586
0205 Having at least 4 crops in the rotation 36 0 58,586 58,586
21 Conversion to organic farming 32 0 58,586 58,586
Panel G: used for triple-difference matching estimates (sep03-mar05)
0301 Implanting cover crops 386 332 58,586 58,918
09 Reduction of fertilizer use 247 206 58,586 58,792
08 Reduction of pesticides use 270 223 58,586 58,809
04 Implanting grass buffer strips 239 199 58,586 58,785
0201 Adding one more crop to the rotation 79 48 58,586 58,634
Notes: (a) CS refers to the calculated number of treated observations lying on the common support.
Details on its calculation are given in appendic B.
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AES Treated CS(a) Non treated Sample
0205 Having at least 4 crops in the rotation 775 661 58,586 59,247
21 Conversion to organic farming 130 63 58,586 58,649
Notes: (a) CS refers to the calculated number of treated observations lying on the common support.
Details on its calculation are given in appendic B.
B Matching procedure
Propensity score and common support
In a first step, we estimate the propensity score P (X): the probability of benefiting from
an AES conditional on control variables (P (X) = Pr(D = 1|X), where X = (T, I, S)).
Rosenbaum and Rubin [38] show that matching on the propensity score is equivalent to
matching on all the observed covariates, thereby dramatically reducing the dimensionality
of the matching problem. We also use the propensity score to estimate the zone of com-
mon support, defined as the set of participants for whom the density of non-participants
having the same propensity score is higher than some cut-off level [45]. The cut-off is
determined so that some overall trimming level is attained.45 We estimate the propen-
sity score by running separate probit regressions on samples containing non-participants
(farmers without any AES) and farmers benefiting from the particular AES that we are
studying. Lechner [31] shows that this simple procedure performs as well as estimating
a multinomial probit.
Matching estimators
With panel data, a typical DID-matching estimator calculates the mean difference be-
tween participants’ mean increments in agricultural practices between dates t′ (before
the treatment) and t (after the treatment), and the mean increments of their matched
counterparts:
Ê
[
Y 1 − Y 0|D = 1
]
= 1
n1
∑
i∈I1∩SP
(
Y 1it − Y 0it′ − Ê
[
Y 0it − Y 0it′|D = 1, Xi
])
(25)
with
Ê
[
Y 0it − Y 0it′|D = 1, Xi
]
=
∑
j∈I0
Wij(Y 0jt − Y 0jt′) (26)
where Y 0 denotes the potential input level (the potential outcome) in the untreated state
(no AES), Y 1 denotes the potential input level (the potential outcome) in the treated
state (with AES), I1 is the group of participants, SP denotes the common support, I0
denotes the group of non-participants and n1 is the number of participants in I1.
45In practice, we first define the set of positive densities: ŜP ={
i : f̂(P (Xi)|Di = 1) > 0 and f̂(P (Xi)|Di = 0) > 0
}
. The common support group is then
the following set: Ŝq =
{
i ∈ I1 ∩ ŜP : f̂(P (Xi)|Di = 1) > cq and f̂(P (Xi)|Di = 0) > cq
}
,
where the cutoff level cq is chosen as the solution to the following problem:
supcq
1
2J
∑
i∈I1∩ŜP
(
1
[
f̂(P (Xi)|Di = 1) < cq
]
+ 1
[
f̂(P (Xi)|Di = 0) < cq
])
≤ q, where I1 is the
group of participants and J is the number of participants in ŜP . In our applications, we choose q = 0.05.
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In what follows, we use two matching estimators. They differ in how the matched
non-participants are chosen and in how the weightsWij are constructed [26]. The nearest-
neighbour matching (NNM) used in the analysis is a multivariate matching based on the
distance between vectors Xj and Xi.46 Such estimator matches each participant i to
its "closest" non-participants j. Both multivariate nearest neighbor matching estimator
(matching on X covariates) and univariate NNM estimator (matching on propensity
score) matches each participant to the four closest non-participants. We use Sekhon
[43]’s implementation of NNM in R.
We also use local linear matching (LLM) which is based on the propensity score
Pi = P (Xi) = Pr(Di = 1|Xi). This estimator constructs a match for each participant
i using a weighted average over all non-participants, where the weights depend on the
distance between propensity scores. The weighting function for LLM is given by:
Wij =
Gij
∑
k∈I0 Gik(Pk − Pi)2 − [Gij(Pj − Pi)][
∑
k∈I0 Gik(Pk − Pi)]∑
j∈I0 Gij
∑
k∈I0 Gik(Pk − Pi)2 − [
∑
k∈I0 Gik(Pk − Pi)]2
(27)
with Gij = G(Pi−Pjh ), where G is a kernel function and h a bandwidth parameter [48].
47
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd [22] advocate the use of this local linear regression version
of the non-parametric kernel matching estimator because it has better performances at
boundary points and adapts better to different data densities [20]. We programmed this
estimator in R. We set the bandwidth to .05. We experimented with a lower bandwidth
of .02 without altering the results.
Bias-corrected matching estimator
Abadie and Imbens [5] show that matching estimators are biased in finite samples when
there is more than one continuous covariate because of inexact matching. We thus use the
bias-corrected matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens [4], which uses linear
regression within the matches to adjust for the remaining differences in their continuous
covariates.48 Such bias-adjustment thus affects the value of the estimator (but not its
variance).
Estimator of the variances of matching estimators
Until recently, the properties of the NNM estimator have not been established because
standard asymptotical analysis does not apply to matching estimators using a finite num-
ber of matches. Moreover, Abadie and Imbens [6] have shown that the bootstrap method
46Letting ‖ X ‖= (X ′SX)(1/2) be the vector norm with positive definite weight matrix S, we define
‖ Xi −Xj ‖ to be the distance between the vectors Xi and Xj . S is the diagonal matrix constructed by
putting the inverses of the variances of the covariates on the diagonal [3].
47In practice, LLM estimation of Wij(Y 0jt − Y 0jt′) simply amounts to estimating a in the following
weighted least squares problem: mina,b
∑
j∈I0
(
(Y 0jt − Y 0jt′)− a− b(Pi − Pj)
)2
Gij .
48The detail procedure is given by Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens [3]. One must estimate
the regression functions for the controls: E(Y 0|X = x) = β̂0 + β̂′1x = µ̂0(x) with (β̂0, β̂1) =
arg min
∑
i:Di=0KM (i)(Yi − β0 − β
′
1Xi)2 where KM (j) is the number of times j is used as a match.
Then, given the estimated regression functions, one can predict the missing potential outcomes as:
Ŷ 0i = 1#JM (i)
∑
j∈JM (i)(Yj + µ̂0(Xi)− µ̂0(Xj)) where #JM (i) is the number of units in the group of M
matches JM (i).
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fails for NNM but is valid for LLM. Abadie and Imbens [5] propose an asymptotically-
consistent estimator of the variance of the NNM estimator for the population average
treatment effect on the treated:
V̂ = 1
N21
N∑
i=1
[
Di(Y 1i − Ŷ 0i − τ̂)2 + (1−Di)(K2M(i)−K
′
M(i))σ̂2Di(Xi)
]
(28)
where τ̂ is the estimated ATT (Ê [(Y 1 − Y 0|D = 1, X, P ]), KM(j) is the number of times
j is used as a match and σ̂2Di(Xi) is an estimator of the conditional outcome variance. As
an estimator of the variance of the LLM estimator we implement a bootstrap procedure.
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